TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/041690/04160010.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 11.6 KB | 249 lines

                                                                                WORLD, Page 26

DIPLOMACY

A Hurry-Up Summit


Despite Lithuania and strategic-arms talks that have hit some
snags, the Bush-Gorbachev meeting is pushed up to May 30

By RICHARD LACAYO -- Reported by Anne Blackman/Moscow and
Michael Duffy and Christopher Ogden/Washington


    When plans were first made for Eduard Shevardnadze's trip
to Washington, the aim was to prepare for the upcoming summit
meeting between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. By the time
the Soviet Foreign Minister arrived for three days of talks
last week, the sessions had taken on far greater importance.
In the wake of Gorbachev's campaign to thwart Lithuania's drive
for independence, Shevardnadze's visit would be watched for
signs of the damage done to U.S.-Soviet relations by Moscow's
tough line -- and to gauge Bush Administration priorities in
the era of waning superpower tensions.

    By the time the Soviet Minister departed, it was clear that
the fate of the tiny Baltic republic, which unilaterally
declared its independence from Moscow, though big enough to be
a stumbling block in the rush toward better relations, was
still too small, for now, to be a decisive obstacle. "We have
an awful lot at stake in the U.S.-Soviet relationship," Bush
said after meeting with the Soviet Minister for 2 hours and 20
minutes on Friday. "An enormous amount at stake."

    Shevardnadze's trip was intended to give both sides a chance
to make last-minute progress on major arms-control agreements
that Bush and Gorbachev hoped to sign the next time they met.
As it happened, the sessions also unveiled a new Soviet
flexibility on Germany and Israel. But the most newsworthy
outcome of Shevardnadze's three days of talks with Bush and
Secretary of State James Baker was simply the announcement of
a date for the summit -- several weeks earlier than Washington
had anticipated. The announcement that the encounter would
start on May 30 in Washington dispelled any question that
Lithuania was important enough to derail the meeting. Before
departing, a satisfied Shevardnadze could announce: "This
summit will certainly become a major event in world affairs."

    That did not mean relations were on the smoothest possible
track. A "tough-love working relationship" was the term White
House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater used to describe
U.S.-Soviet dealings these days. Tough in more ways than one.
During Shevardnadze's five sessions with Baker, some serious
snags appeared in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).
Afterward, a senior Soviet official said it was "impractical"
to assume that a pact limiting the most destructive portions
of the superpower arsenal would be signed at the Bush-Gorbachev
meeting. Nonetheless both U.S. and Soviet sides agreed that all
the major issues involved -- if not the fine print -- would be
resolved by May 30.

    Even before those differences surfaced, George Bush was
having trouble satisfying congressional critics who want firmer
White House support for Lithuania, while at the same time
avoiding any U.S. steps that might play into the hands of
Mikhail Gorbachev's conservative opponents at home. Every time
Gorbachev turns up the pain on Lithuania, Bush winces, and he
had plenty of reason to grimace last week. As Soviet armored
vehicles paraded through Vilnius, the capital, Moscow closed
Lithuania's border with Poland and expelled Western reporters
from the republic.

    The U.S. Congress, meantime, stepped up its efforts to
pressure Bush into showing displeasure with Moscow's tactics.
By a 416-to-3 vote, the House passed a non-binding resolution
urging the President to recognize an independent Lithuania "at
the earliest possible time." Meanwhile, 31 Senators sent a
letter to the White House calling on Bush to spell out U.S.
responses -- from trade sanctions to cancellation of the summit
-- if the Soviets took further measures against Lithuania.

    Unwilling to go that far, Bush seemed to be hoping that
Gorbachev would keep him from having to face the issue. Last
month Bush sent Gorbachev a letter underlining his expectation
that the Soviet leader would not resort to force in Lithuania.
Shevardnadze brought a lengthy return letter from Gorbachev,
but it turned out to be a missive about arms control.

    The Soviet Minister's visit also began amid a flurry of
mixed signals about Lithuania. On his arrival Tuesday,
Shevardnadze asserted that his government's "main weapon" for
resolving any issue is "honest dialogue." His claims were
buttressed in Moscow, where Lithuanian leaders had gone to seek
a meeting with Gorbachev, a sign that the ongoing Soviet
pressure campaign was bearing fruit. The Soviet leader refused
to see the delegation but sent Aleksandr Yakovlev, a close ally
and member of his presidential council. By Thursday, however,
Soviet troops had moved into the chief prosecutor's office in
the Lithuanian capital. They expelled staff members loyal to
the former prosecutor, who was dismissed by Moscow two weeks
ago and replaced by a successor chosen to enforce Soviet law
in the rebellious republic.

    In Washington, Shevardnadze offered another surprise. He
told his American opposite number that Gorbachev wanted a
five-day summit, to begin on May 30. White House officials had
been counting on a visit in late June. They had envisioned a
meeting that would allow the Soviet President time for
sight-seeing and for plenty of leisurely photo opportunities
to remind Americans of the U.S.-Soviet goodwill that has
blossomed under the Bush Administration.

    Why the rush? Gorbachev's reasons were ostensibly domestic.
In addition to his headaches in the Baltics, the Soviet leader
faces a June session of the Congress of the Russian Federation,
the deliberative body of the Russian republic. That will be
followed by the crucial 28th Communist Party Congress, starting
on July 2. At that meeting Gorbachev is expected to consolidate
the transfer of his power base from the party to the newly
formed presidency. "He cannot simply turn up at these
meetings," said a Soviet spokesman. "He has to prepare for
them." Administration officials admitted that the earlier summit
allows Gorbachev to send a strong signal, as one put it, "that
Lithuania isn't going to stand in the way of better relations."

    The accelerated schedule was one reason why work on the
START treaty would not be finished in time for a summit
signing, a goal the two men set for themselves when they met
for the first time in Malta last December. Problems still
remain to be worked out on verification, the range limit of
air-launched cruise missiles and methods for counting warheads
on future types of missiles. Moreover, according to a report in
last week's Washington Post, the START treaty has begun to look
a good deal less sweeping than advertised. Originally, the
treaty was expected to cut in half the U.S. and Soviet nuclear
arsenals. Now it seems that START will countenance deployment
of nearly as many U.S. warheads as at present.

    In their private meetings last week, U.S. and Soviet
negotiators bogged down in an area that the U.S. had thought
was resolved: sea-launched cruise missiles. An agreement forged
last winter would have allowed both nations to abide by
"binding declaratory limits" on the unmanned nuclear-tipped
weapons launched from submarines or surface ships. The deal
would have allowed the U.S. to keep a larger number of SLCMs,
as long as it told Moscow how many were in the American
stockpile.

    Last week the Soviets said they want "equal verifiable
limits" instead, meaning no U.S. advantage. The surprise
reversal led to some tense debates between the negotiators and
caused Bush to admonish Shevardnadze when the two men met on
Friday in the Oval Office. "We have some difficulties on arms
control," the President told his visitor. "I hope they can be
resolved."

    Some other Soviet shifts were more welcome. Bowing to the
inevitable, Shevardnadze announced that his side was dropping
its insistence on neutrality for a unified Germany -- an
important change in Moscow's position. He continued to hold,
however, that Moscow would not agree to the unified nation's
joining NATO. Shevardnadze suggested that Germany might become
part of both the Western alliance and the Warsaw Pact but
offered no specifics. "We were equally firm in our view that
a unified Germany must remain a member of NATO," Baker reported
later.

    Shevardnadze further informed his hosts that Moscow was
willing to implement an agreement offering direct flights for
Soviet-Jewish immigrants to Israel, provided that Israel give
assurances the newcomers would not be settled "in the occupied
territories." Because the Soviets include not only the West
Bank and Gaza but also East Jerusalem in that term, the
Israelis are virtually certain to balk. In addition,
Shevardnadze held out the possibility that Moscow would resume
the diplomatic ties with Israel that were severed in 1967 after
the Six-Day War, though he conditioned that move on the
"overall Middle East situation."

    Even without a START treaty, Bush and Gorbachev should be
able to sign a goodly clump of summit agreements. Among the
topics: cooperation in trade, science, the environment and
activities in space. Plans call for Baker and Shevardnadze to
hold one more preparatory meeting next month in Moscow. "It's
still our hope that major issues will be resolved by the
summit, but that's got to take a lot of work," said Baker.

    That meeting may also settle matters like the itinerary for
Gorbachev's U.S. visit. The President, who favors one-to-one
diplomacy, had hoped to take Gorbachev to the Bush family
retreat in Kennebunkport, Me. Bush is now resigned to the
likelihood that most of the summit will consist of working
sessions in Washington, with the possibility of a side trip to
Camp David. According to a White House official, the President
has begun to accept that Gorbachev is not a "relaxing kind of
guy." With the clock ticking on START and pressure continuing
to build in the Baltics, the next few weeks are likely to be
anything but relaxing.


____________________________________________________________
WHERE THE TREATIES STAND:

    START

    Only an agreement on the major issues in the Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks will be ready for the summit. The treaty
reduces the strategic nuclear warheads on each side to 6,000,
but bomber-carried weapons bring the number closer to 11,000.


    THRESHOLD TEST BAN

    The treaty, capping underground blasts at 150 kilotons, was
signed in 1974 but not ratified. A T.T.B. verification
protocol and a treaty on peaceful uses of nuclear energy should
be ready for signature at the summit.

    CHEMICAL WEAPONS

    A convention reducing Soviet and U.S. chemical weapons to
20% of current U.S. levels is almost certain to be approved at
the summit. Major uncertainties remain about verification
procedures.

    OPEN SKIES

    The Bush initiative to establish mutual surveillance flights
over Warsaw Pact and NATO territory could be concluded at a
Budapest meeting convening later this month. Serious
differences may remain for summit resolution over the types of
sensors to be used and on the quota of flights.

    CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

    Under the pact, U.S. and Soviet troop strength on the
central front will be capped at 195,000. The Soviets want 6,000
aircraft above an agreed 4,700 ceiling on cambat planes. The
C.F.E. treaty will be signed later this year.